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FIDUCIARY DUTY, TORT AND CONTRACT:
A PRIMER ON THE LEGAL
MALPRACTICE PUZZLE
Roy Ryden Anderson *
Walter W. Steele, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
OW to deal with problematic lawyer behavior has become a vogue
subject.' The ever increasing number of lawsuits against lawyers
over the past decade has resulted in increased thinking about the
law of attorney malpractice and has resulted in dramatic changes and devel-
opments in the practice of law and in attitudes about law practice. 2
Three distinct causes of action are potentially available to clients for mis-
behavior by their lawyers: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) breach of con-
tract; and (3) the tort of malpractice. The courts, however, are not in
agreement on the exact nature of and parameters for these causes of action.
Many refuse to recognize the distinctions and dichotomies between and
among the actions, and conclude that regardless of how the cause is charac-
terized it is essentially a tort action for malpractice.3 Such a conclusion,
however, is much too pat. In both pleading and proof, precisely framing the
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1. See generally DENNIS J. HORAN & GEORGE W. SPELLMIRE, ATTORNEY MALPRAC-
TICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE (1989); DAVID J. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRAC-
TICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE (1980); WILLIAM H. GATES & SHEREE L. SWETIN, ABA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, CHARACTERISTICS OF
LEGAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER
(1979); ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW, PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS: THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION (1977).
2. DUKE NORDLINGER STERN & JOANN FELIX-RETZKE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1983); JEFFREY M. SMITH, PREVENTING LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE (1981).
3. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 244 S.E.2d 177, 180 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); see also
Woodburn v. Turley, 625 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1980); Pham v. Nguyen, 763 S.W.2d 467,
469 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809, 814
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ); Gabel v. Sandoval, 648 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, no writ); Citizens State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 386 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding whatever label is placed on a cause of action for
legal malpractice, the action is in the nature of tort).
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nature of the wrong can have a substantial impact on the outcome of the
case, depending upon which cause of action is being alleged.
Although the action for negligence is the most common and well-devel-
oped form for a malpractice claim, the emerging action for breach of fiduci-
ary duty, albeit often misunderstood, may offer the greatest potential for
recovery for a client injured by her attorney's wrongdoing. 4 Despite this
great potential, the recent explosion in malpractice litigation has in the main
centered on the common law tort of negligence, and the doctrine surround-
ing breach of fiduciary duty has been slow to develop.
Commentators have long noted that "[fliduciary obligation is one of the
most elusive concepts in Anglo-American law."5 In general, the fiduciary
relationship between attorney and client imposes upon the attorney a "duty
to exercise in all his relationships with this client-principal the most scrupu-
lous honor, good faith and fidelity to his client's interest."'6 However, how
this standard of care plays out in the attorney-client relationship has been
little explored by the courts.
Whether the cause of action is for negligence, breach of contract, or viola-
tion of the fiduciary standard, a central purpose of the particular cause of
action is to guard against and remedy exploitation of the power lawyers have
to control clients' lives and property. Of course, the degree of protection
afforded and the ultimate remedy available to the client may vary signifi-
cantly depending upon the particular cause of action at issue. In this article
we seek to demonstrate that this critical choice of law is too often ad hoc and
accidental, and that, even when the choice is correctly made, the differences
4. Commentators suggest that the tort of breach of fiduciary duty, while involving a
wrong distinct and independent from professional negligence, still constitutes legal malprac-
tice. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11.1, at 633 (3d
ed. 1989). What this generalization overlooks is that legal malpractice is professional negli-
gence. Like all negligence, professional negligence is failure to perform. Breach of fiduciary
duty is not failure to perform. Breach of fiduciary duty is failure to adhere to the authority
granted by the client. An attorney-client relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the lawyer
to represent the client with undivided loyalty. Failing to give undivided loyalty does not neces-
sarily mean that the attorney performed legal services negligently. Instead, failure to give undi-
vided loyalty to the client means that the attorney performed the legal service outside the scope
of the authority (fiduciary duty) granted by the client. The importance in understanding the
particular nature and elements of breach of fiduciary duty is that "[ciourts throughout the
United States have not hesitated to impose civil sanctions upon attorneys who breach their
fiduciary duties to their clients, which sanctions have been imposed separately and apart from
professional discipline." Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277,
1286 (Pa. 1992). Thus, the sanctions for breach of fiduciary duty exist separate and apart from
not only professional malpractice, but also professional disciplinary proceedings conducted by
the state bar associations in conjunction with the Code or Rules of Professional Responsibility.
5. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 879. "Little has been written about the origin of fiduciary law, the rationales
behind the creation of fiduciary duties, the remedies for violation of these duties, and the meth-
ods by which courts fashion such remedies." Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV.
795, 796 (1983). Additionally, it is clear that the fiduciary duties and obligations and the
breach of those obligations are separate concepts from the jurisprudence of legal ethics. Fidu-
ciary obligation brings its own set of enforcement mechanisms and rules which are totally
independent from the various state rules of ethics and enforcement procedures.
6. Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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and distinctions among the available causes of actions are often ignored by
the courts.
In deciding whether or not to grant the particular cause of action and in
deciding the available remedy, the courts must make policy decisions.
Should the remedy available to the client be measured against the amount of
harm caused by the attorney's misbehavior? Should legal presumptions, re-
buttable or irrebuttable, be applied so as to afford greater protection to cli-
ents from attorneys than they would have from other vendors of goods and
services in the market place? Against what standard should the attorney's
conduct be measured: reasonableness, uberrima fides, or some other?
Should the standard vary depending upon the nature of the cause of action?
These and other issues comprise our agenda.
II. THE RATIONALE OF CAUSES OF ACTION
Legal remedies usually do not develop prospectively. Absent legislative
intervention, a dispute between parties must occur before a legal remedy
develops. If a particular type of dispute reappears with sufficient frequency,
and if the courts determine that an interest in dispute is worthy of legal
protection, the courts may develop a remedy to resolve that dispute that
acquires the status of a cause of action. 7 Once a type of dispute achieves this
status, an ordering of relationships between parties may occur as they at-
tempt to conform their conduct to reflect their respective legal rights an-
nounced by that cause of action. Thus, a cause of action may serve not only
as an outline to be used by a court to settle disputes between parties, but it
may also channel the conduct of parties within the legal boundaries estab-
lished by the cause of action.
Every distinct cause of action allocates the rights of the respective parties
through its particular elements unique to that cause of action. Some of these
allocations are procedural in nature and some are substantive. In either
case, the purpose of the allocation is to balance the respective rights of the
disputants. Thus, the cause of action establishes a public policy to which
society demands that its citizens conform. Nothing requires that the rights
of the parties to a particular cause of action be balanced. One party may be
awarded a particular advantage over the other based on a policy decision
arising from the nature of the relationship between the parties.
Willis v. Maverick 8 is a good example of a court's balancing procedural
rights between the parties in a legal malpractice case. The issue before the
court was whether the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice case
7. For example, in many states statutory causes of action now exist for consumers to
seek redress for wrongdoings of providers of goods and services. See Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon
1987 & Supp. 1993) ("DTPA"). Before the enactment of the DTPA consumers were forced to
seek remedies through common-law types of actions such as breach of warranty, breach of
contact, fraud, or others. See John R. Harrison, Jr., Comment, The Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act: The Shield Becomes a Sword, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 879, 883-84
(1986).
8. 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
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should begin to run from the time the alleged malpractice occurred, or in-
stead, from the time the aggrieved client discovered, or should have discov-
ered, the alleged malpractice. Obviously, applying the customary occurrence
rule would favor attorneys, and applying the discovery rule would favor
clients.
The Supreme Court of Texas noted that, although the lower courts in
Texas had reached divergent results on the question, the issue was one of
first impression for it. 9 The court further noted that the occurrence rule was
the general rule followed in Texas for medical malpractice, the cause of ac-
tion accruing when the facts came into existence that authorized a claimant
to seek a judicial remedy regardless of whether the claimant might reason-
ably have discovered the wrong.10 The case at bar required the court to
decide whether to deviate from the general rule in adjusting the rights of the
parties.
For various policy reasons and because of the special nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship, the court chose to favor clients by adopting the dis-
covery rule in legal malpractice cases."I The court found that the policy
justifications long relied upon by Texas courts for adopting the discovery
rule in other kinds of causes of action were no less compelling in legal mal-
practice actions. 12 The court emphasized that attorneys are expected, as
professionals, to function at a high level of expertise.13 Although the client
may, in the sense of the occurrence rule, be well aware of all the facts relating
to his attorney's performance, the client often will not have sufficient legal
acumen to perceive initially that the attorney's performance did not measure
up. 14 The court reasoned that the special relationship between attorney and
client further justified imposition of the discovery rule. 15 That relationship
requires, inter alia, that the attorney make full and fair disclosure to the
client of all facts material to the client's representation. 16 The court con-
cluded that application of the discovery rule would vindicate the full disclo-
sure requirement by preventing the fiduciary from becoming immune from
liability because of the client's inability to perceive the attorney's
nondisclosure. 17
Just as with procedural rights, courts may balance substantive rights of
parties to level the playing field for the weaker party. A good case in point is
9. Id. at 645.
10. Id. at 644.
11. Id. at 645-46; see also Jampole v. Matthews, 857 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
12. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 645.
13. Id.




17. Id. at 645-46. The court relied heavily in its reasoning on the watershed decision of
the California Supreme Court in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d
421 (Cal. 1971).
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Rice v. Perl,'8 wherein Rice retained Perl to represent her in a personal in-
jury action. Perl subsequently settled the case with the insurance adjuster.
The insurance adjuster was also on Perl's payroll, a fact that Perl did not
disclose to Rice. Later, upon discovering that the adjuster was simultane-
ously in the employ of both her lawyer and the insurance company, Rice
sued her attorney. Rice did not allege any dissatisfaction with the amount of
the settlement Perl had obtained for her, but maintained that Perl had
breached the fiduciary obligation of full disclosure by not informing her of
the adjuster's dual employment.
In the context of the present discussion, it is important to note that appli-
cation of customary legal rules would tilt the outcome of the case heavily in
favor of the attorney. Although the attorney had violated the duty of full
disclosure by a fiduciary, the attorney's wrong had caused no injury to any
interest of the aggrieved client normally protected by law. The client had
not suffered damages in either tort or contract, since she was no worse off
financially than had full disclosure been made. Further, the client had ap-
parently not relied to her detriment on the attorney's nondisclosure, nor had
the attorney been unjustly enriched by his failure to disclose his relationship
with the insurance adjuster. In short, the client had not suffered an injury
normally compensable in a tort action (being no worse off than had the
wrong not occurred), nor had the client suffered injury to either her expecta-
tion, reliance, or restitution interests, the interests normally protected by the
law of contract.19
Nevertheless, the court balanced the interests of the parties in favor of the
client by fashioning a unique legal remedy outside the normal course. Under
this remedy, the attorney was held to forfeit his right to compensation and
was required to refund all legal fees earned to the client. 20 The court justi-
fied adjusting the rights of the parties in this fashion because of basic policy
considerations requiring strict fidelity of the attorney to the interests of both
his clients and the courts. 2' Notwithstanding the lack of any cognizable in-
jury to his client, the attorney was required to forfeit all legal fees earned
under the tainted relationship. 22
III. THE NATURE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
With its roots in equity, the jurisprudence of fiduciary duty has remained
fluid over time. For purposes of the present discussion, it is important to
explore the nature of fiduciary duty, and why it exists, in order to distinguish
an action for breach fiduciary duty from actions by clients against attorneys
for breach of contract or legal malpractice. All attorneys realize that a fidu-
ciary relationship exists with their clients, but the precise nature and mean-
18. 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979) (establishing the expecta-
tion, reliance and restitution interests as those protected by the law of contract remedies).





ing of that relationship is quite vague. 23 Analyzing the nature and extent of
a lawyer's fiduciary duty to a client is not easy. The courts have purposely
left its parameters vague so as to encompass new situations as they arise.24
Indeed, violation of the fiduciary standard is often given the sobriquet "con-
structive fraud," and one court has suggested the following trenchant ration-
ale for leaving indefinite the boundaries of fraud-related causes of action:
Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite. Fraud being infinite and taking on pro-
tean form at will, were courts to cramp themselves by defining it with a
hard and fast definition, their jurisdiction would be cunningly circum-
vented at once by new schemes beyond the definition. Messieurs, the
fraud-feasors, would like nothing half so well as for courts to say they
would go thus far and no further in its pursuit. Accordingly definitions
of fraud are of set purpose left general and flexible, and thereto courts
match their astuteness against the versatile inventions of fraud-doers. 25
Thus, although definitions of an attorney's fiduciary duty to her client
abound, they are framed in quite general terms. The following is typical:
"[T]he relationship between attorney and client has been described as one of
uberrimafides, which means, 'most abundant good faith', requiring absolute
and perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any conceal-
ment or deception."' 26 Fiduciary obligation is shaped by the discretionary
control that an attorney usually has over a significant aspect of the client's
life or assets, and by the fact that very often the interests of the lawyer are
not always the same as, and may be in conflict with, those of the client. 27 In
Garrett v. Bank West 28 the court explained the special nature of a relation-
ship that gives rise to fiduciary obligation in this way:
There is no invariable rule which determines the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, but it is manifest in all the decisions that there must be not
only confidence of the one in the other, but there must exist a certain
inequality, dependence, weakness of age, of mental strength, business
intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved, or other conditions, giving
to one advantage over the other.29
The leading commentary adds that "the basic fiduciary obligations are
two-fold: undivided loyalty and confidentiality. Although the phrasing...
is varied and often dependent upon the context of particular circumstances,
23. DeMott, supra note 5, at 879-80; see also Frankel, supra note 5, at 797-808.
24. Equity jurisprudence is the parent of the law of fiduciary obligation, and since it was
the function of equity to fill the gaps of the more rigid common law, one might expect that the
law pertinent to fiduciaries would be somewhat fluid and amorphus. Because the concept of
fiduciary and the rules pertaining thereto developed in the law of equity, it follows that the
substantive law of fiduciary obligation is quite fact specific. See DeMott, supra note 5, at 881-
82.
25. Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913) (citations omitted).
26. Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991,
writ denied).
27. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking -
Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985).
28. 459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990).
29. Id. at 838 (quoting Yuster v. Keefe, 90 N.E. 920 (Ind. App. 1910)).
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this rule exists in every jurisdiction in the United States." 30 Fiduciary duties
include acting with utmost fairness to clients, 3' making full disclosure, 32
avoiding representation which conflicts with that of the client, 33 and preserv-
ing confidences of the client. 34 The fiduciary obligation arises from the as-
cendancy of the attorney in relationship to his client because:
[W]hen an agreement creates a relationship in which one party's deci-
sions can severely limit the benefit that the other party will derive form
the agreement or drastically increase the cost of performance, the obli-
gation to act in good faith may constrain decisions that would otherwise
be within the parties' independent discretion.35
Such statements emphasize the deprecation with which the fiduciary must
often regard his own interests when they oppose those of a client.36
This core concept requiring self deprecation by the attorney because of his
bargaining power and general ascendancy over his client contrasts markedly
with the general presumptions of the law of contract regarding the parties'
freedom to contract. Contract law generally assumes that parties bargain at
arms length, whether or not the parties actually share equal bargaining lev-
erage, and that the resulting bargain governs their relationship. 37 Fiduciary
30. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 11.1, at 631.
31. Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 107 P. 560, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906); In re Anderson, 287
N.E.2d 682, 684 (Ill. 1972); In re Broverman, 239 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ill. 1963); Greenbaum &
Browne, Ltd. v. Braun, 410 N.E.2d 303, 306 (11. App. Ct. 1980); Daugherty v. Runner, 581
S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
32. Crean v. Chozick, 714 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
33. Hunter v. Troup, 146 N.E. 321, 324 (I11. 1925); Easley v. Brookline Trust Co., 256
S.W.2d 983, 989 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kurbitz v. Kurbitz, 468
P.2d 673, 674 (Wash. 1970); see also 7a C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 150 (1980).
34. Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct: App. 1982); Hunter, 146
N.E.2d at 324; Kurbitz, 468 P.2d at 674-75.
35. DeMott, supra note 5, at 896.
36. Authorities provide lofty explanations about the inherent duties and the justification
for these responsibilities as well as for the extraordinary burdens placed on the attorneys:
In all relations with his client, an attorney is bound to the highest degree of
fidelity and good faith. Strict adherence to this rule of conduct is required by
time-honored, deeply rooted concepts of public policy. Since the relationship
puts the attorney in a position to avail himself of the necessities of his client and
to gain knowledge that can be used to the client's disadvantage, any business
transaction between attorney and client is presumptively invalid in law - a
presumption that the attorney can overcome only by the clearest and most con-
vincing evidence, showing full and complete disclosure of all facts known to the
attorney and absolute independence of action on the part of the client. The
burden of proof is always upon the attorney, as a fiduciary, to establish clearly
the absence of any taint in the transaction; otherwise it is voidable.
Melson v. Michlin, 223 A.2d 338, 344 (Del. 1966).
37. We do not mean to suggest that parties' freedom to contract is unfettered or that the
courts do not have broad based power to police contracts. However, the standards of review in
contract such as unconscionability and illegality, or even the good faith/bad faith dichotomy,
are far less strict than the fiduciary standard of uberrima fides. Even regarding standardized
form contracts, which no doubt constitute the documentation of the vast majority of dickered
deals, wherein one party clearly has the dominant bargaining position over the other, simple
fairness is at best the strictest standard suggested by the law of contracts. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979) (suggesting that in standardized agreements, where
one party has reason to believe that the other would not assent to a particular term in the
writing were he made aware of it, the term does not become part of the agreement). See
1994]
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relationships, particularly those involving attorney and client, usually begin
with a contract. But in the eyes of the law, fiduciary relationships are never
arms length. With respect to such agreements, the law jettisons the general
presumptions and standards of the law of contract and applies instead the
stricter fiduciary standard.3 8 Of course, the express terms of fiduciary agree-
ments are not irrelevant to ascertaining the fiduciary's obligations, but the
intention of the parties manifested by the agreement does not control in the
same way as it would under typical contract doctrine.3 9
The jurisprudential underpinnings of fiduciary obligation have never been
mapped successfully. Scholars have examined several competing theories as
justification for fiduciary law, including the so-called property theory,4° the
reliance theory, 4 1 the unequal relationship theory,42 the contractual the-
ory,43 the unjust enrichment theory, 44 the commercial utility theory,45 and
generally John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1982); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning
of Contract: The Transformation of Contract Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21
(1984); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
38. DeMott, supra note 5, at 896.
39. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.08(g) (1991), reprinted in
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon Supp. 1993). The rule states:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liabil-
ity to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is indepen-
dently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability
with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person
in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection
therewith.
Id. Note that Texas Rule 1.08(g) is identical to the American Bar Association MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) (1992).
40. The property theory states that "a fiduciary relationship exists where one person has
legal title and/or control over property or other advantage, and another person is the beneficial
owner thereof." J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAWQ. REV. 51, 63 (1981). The property theory is rarely proposed by recent discussion. Id.
41. The reliance theory is perhaps the most basic and commonly cited theory of the na-
ture of the fiduciary relationship. The theory postures that the relationship exists where one
person places trust, confidence, or reliance in another. Scholars have criticized the theory
because it is not analytic but descriptive only and because it is vague. Id. at 58-59.
42. The unequal relationship theory developed as a result of the position of the parties
who deal with one another. This inequality may be de jure as a result of the mere dominion of
one over another. Because one party has this inherent power by virtue of his position of domi-
nance, he has certain duties to the dependent party. The vulnerability or inequality of bargain-
ing power is the center piece of the doctrine and the rationale for the resulting duties. Id. at
61.
43. The contractual theory defines the fiduciary relationship as one where one party relies
on or trusts another and such reliance is accepted. The relationship is not a contract per se,
but is at least a contract in form. It is often described as an implied contact or an equitable
right. Thus: "Who is a fiduciary? A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interest
of another person. It is immaterial whether the undertaking is in the form of a contract. It is
immaterial that the undertaking is gratuitous." Id. at 64-65 (quoting Austin Scott, The Fiduci-
ary Principle, 37 CAL. L.J. 521, 540 (1949)).
44. The fiduciary relationship exists under the unjust enrichment theory "where one per-
son obtains property or other advantage which justice requires should belong to another." Id.
at 53. Courts force such a defendant to disgorge any external profits received by a fiduciary as
a result of the relationship. Often the remedy is in the form of a constructive trust. Id. at 53-
54.
45. The commercial utility theory is based strictly on policy rather than morality. The
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the power and discretion theory.46 Although there is no consensus on the
one dominant or most correct theory, the fundamental focus of all of these
theories is the beneficiary's transfer of power to the principal encumbered by
accompanying duties. For the legal profession, the notion of a fiduciary's
placing himself on a plane subsidiary to that of the beneficiary is sociologi-
cally compatible with the concept of a professional. A professional is "some-
one who serves another with special knowledge and skill but also at times
and in places or circumstances which may be quite inconvenient or unpleas-
ant for the professional. More than by mere competence, the professional is
distinguished by special dedication to a spirit of service."'47
As discussed previously, balancing the rights between disputants is an in-
herent function of all causes of action. The cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty takes a very distinctive approach to that task. Only the fiduci-
ary is regulated under the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and
the cause of action thus takes a myopic focus exclusively on the alleged
abuses of the fiduciary "because only he is vested with power that can be
abused."'48
In contrast to contract and status law, a salient feature of fiduciary
law is that it regulates only one of the parties-the fiduciary....
In the world of contract, self-interest is the norm, and restraint
must be imposed by others. In contrast, the altruistic posture of fiduci-
ary law requires that once an individual undertakes to act as a fiduciary,
he should act to further the interests of another in preference to his
own.
49
IV. BASIC JURISPRUDENTIAL DISTINCTIONS AMONG THE
THREE CAUSES OF ACTION
We turn now to a brief discussion of the basic jurisprudential distinctions
that separate the causes of action by clients against attorneys for breach of
fiduciary duty, for tort, and for breach of contract. We will then present a
more detailed analysis of the rationality of these three causes of action as
resolution mechanisms for disputes between attorney and client. Making the
choice between the three causes of action can have an impact upon the reme-
doctrine finds a fiduciary relationship when the "court feels necessary to hold a person.., to a
higher than average standard of ethics or good faith in the interests of protecting the integrity
of the commercial enterprise." Shepard, supra note 40, at 56-57. This theory is often manifest
in the context of the so-called corporate opportunity doctrine. Id.
46. The power and discretion theory involves a two-step analysis of "(a) the power to
change the legal position of another, and (b) a discretion in the exercise of that power." Id. at
68. The essence of the theory is the power of one party over the other and the relative weak-
ness of the reliant party. The domination does not have to be overt, but instead may arise
implicitly because of the respective roles of the parties in the relationship or because of the
inherent power the fiduciary has in the relationship. Id. at 68-69.
47. Kenneth L. Penegar, The Professional Project: A Response to Terrell and Wildman, 41
EMORY L.J. 473, 475 (1992).
48. Frankel, supra note 5, at 819.
49. Id. at 819, 830.
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dies ultimately available to the client. For example, basic procedural de-
fenses which are usually available to attorneys in contract and tort actions
may be denied to the attorney if the client's cause of action is for breach of a
fiduciary duty.50 Similarly, defenses based on good faith and reasonable
workmanlike performance may be raised by the attorney in contract and tort
actions, but if the cause of action is for breach of fiduciary duty, such de-
fenses may not be used. 51
The basis for fiduciary responsibility is dominance of one person over an-
other. The law of fiduciary obligations presumes from the lawyer's expertise
and professionalism a lawyer's dominance over her client. Although the de-
pendent client may choose from among lawyers and even negotiate, often
with specificity, terms of the relationship, the lawyer's expertise assures that
ultimate power in that relationship will rest with the attorney. Classical
contract theory would view the relationship between the contracting parties
much differently. Indeed, contract theory celebrates the parties' freedom to
contract and presumes arms length bargaining. According to contract the-
ory, parties do not use monopoly to achieve purpose, but instead rely upon
persuasion and exchange with each party being free to determine and
achieve his own needs from the bargain. 52 Classical contract theory, then,
ignores the relational aspect of the transaction and, in so doing, deprives the
parties of protections that might arise from the status relationship.5 3
As with all contracts, the attorney-client contract may expressly establish
performance obligations and, although attorney-client contracts rarely ex-
pressly establish warranties of the level of performance expected from the
attorney, many courts have found an implied promise by the lawyer to exer-
cise due care while representing the client. 54 Thus, a suit between a client
50. See Burgin v. Godwin, 167 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ
ref'd w.o.m.) (holding that lawyer had no statute of frauds defense to contract with client
because lawyer had fiduciary duty to warn client of need for writing when contract was orally
modified). "A finding that a relationship is fiduciary can result in the avoidance not only of
limitation periods, but also of the rules relating to remoteness of damages and other restrictive
doctrines." J. C. SHEPHERD, LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 9 (1981).
51. "The presence of good faith and sincere motives may prevent constructive fraud from
becoming actual fraud, but cannot excuse noncompliance with the obligations that there be
uncompromised fidelity, complete confidentiality and full disclosure." MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 4, § 11.3, at 640.
52. For an excellent discussion of classical notions of freedom of contract, see Friedrich
Kesslery, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629 (1943).
53. Of course, much of the recent development in contract law has been marked by an
infusion of relational contract theory and its concomitant policing of bargains to root out
unfair and opportunistic behavior by a contracting party who takes unfair advantage of his
status relation. Cf Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 789 (1993) (arguing that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code inadequately
addresses the relational aspect of contracts). See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Respon-
sive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1984); Symposium, Law, Private Govern-
ance, and Continuing Relationships, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 461; Ian R. McNeil, Relational
Contracts. What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483.
54. Some courts have found implicit in any agreement for professional services a promise
to exercise ordinary judgment, care, skill, and diligence in the rendition of the services. Buc-
quet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (Ct. App. 1976); Floro v. Lawton, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98,
107 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 524-25 (1823); Kartikes v. Demos,
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and his lawyer may be based on a breach of contract without raising issues of
negligence or violation of the attorney's fiduciary obligations. In such cases,
the allegation is simply that the attorney did not do what the contract, by
expression or implication, said that he would do.
On the other hand, when the attorney's performance falls short of that
expected of an ordinary, reasonably prudent lawyer, the attorney is guilty of
the tort of malpractice. And this holds true whether or not the attorney has
violated the terms of the contract or the norms established for him as a
fiduciary. Further, the attorney might breach his fiduciary duty to the client
even though he has complied fully with the terms of the attorney-client con-
tract and even though the level of his performance has not been substandard.
The fiduciary standard of care is not that of an ordinary, prudent lawyer, but
a standard of "the most scrupulous honor, good faith and fidelity to his cli-
ent's interest." 55
Consequently, all lawyers are necessarily under three concurrent obliga-
tions to their clients: (1) to perform their contractual obligations, (2) to per-
form in representing the client as ordinary, prudent lawyers, and (3) to
exercise in that performance utmost good faith and fidelity. The availability
of a particular cause of action to a client against her attorney thus depends
upon two specific factors: the parameters of the attorney-client relationship
and the particular misconduct of the attorney at issue.
V. PARAMETERS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
The formal relationship between attorney and client normally begins with
a contract. This contract can vary in complexity on a continuum from, on
the one end, a detailed legal document, such as a multi-page conditional fee
contract, articulating specific obligations of both parties to, on the other end,
a cursory oral agreement concluded by a perfunctory handshake through
jailhouse bars. The contract embodies the attorney's contractual obligations,
the breach of which gives rise to a cause of action for that breach. The
breach need not, however, be of an oral or written obligation, but may result
from the nonperformance of an obligation that arises by rational implication
214 So. 2d 86, 86-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Rooker v. Bruce, 90 N.E. 86, 87 (Ind. Ct. App.
1909); Thomas v. Schee, 45 N.W. 539, 540 (Iowa 1890); Gill v. DiFatta, 364 So.2d 1352, 1356
(La. Ct. App. 1978); Roehl v. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Mo. 1935); Dunn v. McKay, Bur-
ton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978); Peters v. Simmons, 552 P.2d
1053, 1056 (Wash. 1976). The implied promise reflects the same standard of care applicable in
determining negligence. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 8.5, at 417. If an attorney agrees
to perform specific services or acts, there may be an action for breach of express contract. A
cause of action for breach of express contract may not require proof of the applicable standard
of care or proof by expert testimony as is required in other malpractice cases because it is based
on a breach of a specific promise. Some courts and commentators do not characterize such a
breach as malpractice at all because the breach is not unique to the profession and because it is
viewed as merely a failure to perform a promise rather than a deficiency in the quality of
services. See Lindner v. Eichel, 232 N.Y.S.2d 240, 244 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 238
(App. Div. 1962); MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 8.4, at 416. Cases based on actions for
breach of express contract seldom occur because the attorney-client contracts rarely express
specific promises or guarantees.
55. Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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from the terms of the contract. For example, in Santulli v. Englert, Reilly &
McHugh, P. C. 6 the client had retained the law firm to represent him in the
sale of a business. The law firm negotiated the terms of the contract of sale
at a price of $75,000, a substantial portion of which was to be secured by a
first mortgage on property owned by the buyer's father. The law firm pre-
pared the mortgage but failed to execute it properly. The client suffered a
loss when the buyer subsequently defaulted and the improper execution of
the mortgage was discovered. The client then sued the law firm for breach
of the retainer agreement. The law firm alleged that it was not liable for
breach of contract because it had not made a specific promise to perform the
act of preparing and executing the mortgage. In finding for the client on the
contract claim, the court reasoned that a promise to prepare and execute the
mortgage properly arose by reasonable implication from the retainer con-
tract and that the law firm had breached the implied promise.57
Nevertheless, to emphasize a trite but important point, no contract action
may be maintained against the attorney unless the client can show that the
attorney has breached an express or implied obligation assumed by the attor-
ney under the terms of the contract. 58 A breach of contract action in favor
of the client, thus, is based on the consensual undertakings of the attorney.
The gist of the action is the attorney's violation of an agreement willingly
made. The law of tort, through the action for malpractice, and the law per-
taining to fiduciaries, through the action for breach of a fiduciary obligation,
however, add an important gloss to the contractual relationship of the attor-
ney and client by imposing on the attorney, notwithstanding negotiation or
agreement, tort obligations of due care and non-negligent performance and
fiduciary obligations of utmost propriety and consideration for the interests
of the client. The essence of an action for breach of contract is violation of
an obligation assumed by consent. The essence of an action in tort for negli-
gence or for breach of a fiduciary obligation is violation of a standard im-
posed, not by agreement, but by societal norms.5 9 Whether a cause of action
exists in tort or in contract for a failure to abide by these various obligations
depends upon the nature of attorney misconduct.
VI. NATURE OF MISCONDUCT
In theory, the distinction between contract law and tort law is thus clear.
Contract law applies to obligations voluntarily undertaken between parties
and is premised upon mutual agreement and the expectations of the parties.
Tort law involves social responsibility regardless of undertaking and requires
a standard of conduct for the protection of others. The failure to comply
with that standard imposes liability even absent a contract. Tort duties de-
56. 586 N.E.2d 1014 (N.Y. 1992).
57. Id. at 1016.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) (defining contract as "a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the perform-
ance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty").
59. See DeMott, supra note 5, at 887.
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pend upon foreseeability, the likelihood of injury, the nature of risks, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against injury, and the consequences of
placing the burden upon the defendant. 6°
Courts in most jurisdictions do not limit a plaintiff in a suit for attorney
wrongdoing to one particular cause of action, but instead allow an action for
legal malpractice to sound in either tort or contract. 6' However, the courts
have traditionally maintained that the causes of action for breach of contract
and tort are distinct and individual. This tradition is soundly rooted in the
historical distinctions regarding pleading requirements, and in the vast dif-
ferences in the underlying rationales for the existence of the causes of action.
In the words of one court:
Where the act complained of is a breach of specific terms of the contract
without any reference to the legal duties imposed by law upon the rela-
tionship created thereby, the action is contractual. Where the essential
claim of the action is a breach of a duty imposed by law upon the rela-
tionship of attorney-client and not of the contract itself, the action is in
tort.6 2
These concepts, however, are not always independent. Contractual
promises do create duties, and the failure to perform a particular contractual
duty may represent not only a breach of contract, but negligence as well.
This may be particularly true where an attorney's failure to perform a ser-
vice as promised will often also represent a failure to perform with a stan-
dard of care of a reasonably prudent attorney. This overlapping of contract
and tort duties is well illustrated by the case of Hale v. Groce. 63 The case is
particularly interesting because it involved actions against an attorney for
both tort and breach of contract brought by a plaintiff who was not a client
of, nor in privity of contract with, the defendant attorney. The attorney had
been directed by his client to prepare testamentary instruments and to in-
clude a bequest of a sum of money to the plaintiff. After the death of the
client, the plaintiff discovered that the gift was not included either in the will
or in the related trust instrument.
60. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 326-27 (4th
ed. 1971). While Prosser recognizes the difficulty of stating an adequate rule for when a tort
duty exists, he concludes that "[n]o better general statement can be made, than that courts will
find a duty where ... reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists." Id.
61. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 627 (Md. 1985); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417
So. 2d 926, 927 (Miss. 1982); Denzer v. Rouse, 180 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Wis. 1970). See gener-
ally RONALD E. MALLEN & VICTOR B. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 382 (2d ed. 1981).
62. Pancake House v. Redmond, 716 P.2d 575, 578 (Kan. 1986); see also Hall v. Nichols,
400 S.E.2d 901, 904 (W. Va. 1990); Malone v. University of Kan. Medical Ctr., 552 P.2d 885,
888 (Kan. 1976). The Malone court found:
A breach of contract may be said to be a material failure of performance of a
duty arising under or imposed by agreement. A tort, on the other hand, is a
violation of a duty imposed by law, a wrong independent of contract. Torts can,
of course, be committed by parties to a contract. The question to be determined
here is whether the actions or omissions complained of constitute a violation of
duties imposed by law, or of duties arising by virtue of the alleged express agree-
ment between the parties.
Id.
63. 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987).
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The plaintiff then sued the attorney, maintaining status as an intended
beneficiary64 of the attorney-client retainer contract. The petition set forth
two separate claims, one for negligence and the other for breach of the prom-
ise made by the attorney to his client to make the bequest for the benefit of
the plaintiff. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss both
claims, apparently on the ground that neither stated a cognizable cause of
action in either contract or tort. The intermediate appellate court reinstated
the tort claim but affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the contract claim.
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon held for the plaintiff, find-
ing that a cause of action had been stated under both tort and contract theo-
ries. 65 In reaching its conclusion, the court specifically rejected the
defendant's assertion that an attorney owes a professional duty of care only
to his client and thus could be sued for malpractice only by that client.66
The court noted a split in authority on the issue. While many courts have
recognized the right of non-clients to sue an attorney for professional negli-
gence, 67 other courts have rejected such "open-ended tort liability to
foreseeably injured third parties" 68 and have allowed non-clients to recover
against attorneys, if at all, only as third-party beneficiaries under contract
law's more restrictive standards regarding foreseeability and scope of risk. 69
The court in Hale, however, opted to reaffirm its earlier decision in another
case70 by leaving both theories of recovery open to third parties depending
upon the legal rule at issue 71 and the nature of misconduct alleged by the
complaint. 72 The court then made a detailed examination of the plaintiff's
complaint. The court found that, although part of the complaint alleged
professional negligence, other paragraphs of the complaint alleged breach of
a specific promise. 73 Since these latter allegations were "not that defendant
performed this promise negligently, but that he did not perform it at all,"'74
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for breach of contract as well as for
64. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979) states:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee
to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the benefici-
ary the benefit of the promised performance.
65. Hale, 744 P.2d at 1290.
66. Id. at 1292.
67. The leading case is that of the California Supreme Court in Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d
161 (Cal. 1969); see also Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (III. 1984) (allowing action on
both tort and breach of contract theories).
68. Hale, 744 P.2d at 1291.
69. A leading case for this more restrictive attitude is that of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983).
70. Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 611 P.2d 1158 (Or. 1980).
71. The legal rule at issue in Hale was the applicable statute of limitations. Hale, 744
P.2d at 1292.
72. Id. at 1292-93.
73. Id. at 1293.
74. Id.
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malpractice. 75
A much different type of misconduct distinguishes the tort action of mal-
practice from the tort action for breach of fiduciary duty.76 The malpractice
action sanctions negligent performance. 77 The essence of an action for mal-
practice is violation of a standard of care. A breach of fiduciary duty, how-
ever, involves violation of a standard of conduct, not a standard of care. As
a fiduciary, an attorney has a duty "to represent the client with undivided
loyalty, to preserve the client's confidences, and to disclose any material
matters bearing upon the representation [of the client]."' 78
It is hornbook law that proof of legal malpractice requires expert testi-
mony that the defendant attorney has violated a standard of care and reason-
ableness so that a jury may properly determine whether an attorney has
acted in a reasonably prudent manner. However, since an action for breach
of fiduciary duty requires merely a showing of misconduct rather than viola-
tion of a standard of care, proof of a breach of fiduciary duty may be shown
without resort to expert testimony. 79 An attorney's fiduciary duty encom-
passes undivided loyalty, and a standard of solicitude that requires placing
the client's interests over those of the attorney. These duties may be violated
without any showing of negligence.80 On the other hand, the malprac-
tice/negligence standard allows an attorney to take his own interests into
consideration while performing legal services in a reasonably prudent man-
ner.8 ' Thus, legal malpractice contemplates a balancing of interests between
attorney and client, a concept which the law of fiduciary obligation definitely
rejects.
Conversely, an attorney may violate the malpractice standard of care
without being in violation of the fiduciary standard of conduct. For exam-
ple, in Calhoun v. Rane8 2 the client retained an attorney to represent him
before the Illinois Industrial Commission. Although the attorney did file a
75. Id.
76. Although the breach of fiduciary duty does not involve violation of a negligence stan-
dard of care, most courts nevertheless characterize the breach of fiduciary duty as a tort. See
Citizens State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
77. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 3.
78. Id. § 11.1, at 631.
79. See Johnson v. DeLay, 809 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
80. The fiduciary duty between an attorney and client is so strong that it gives rise to a
duty for the attorney to disclose the possibility of his own malpractice as long as the attorney-
client relationship is in existence. Conversely, nondisclosure is treated per se as concealment
and the statute of limitations on any cause of action is tolled until the relationship ends. Crean
v. Chozick, 714 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But once the
attorney-client relationship ends, the statute of limitations is no longer tolled. Guy v. Schuldt,
138 N.E.2d 891, 895 (Ind. 1956); see also Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand,
491 P.2d 421, 429 (Cal. 1971).
81. "The duty of loyalty sometimes requires the fiduciary to give no weight to her own
interests. This same requirement, however, becomes unreasonable in the duty-of-care con-
text." Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Char-
acter and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1058-59 (1991).
82. 599 N.E.2d 1318 (I11. App. Ct. 1992).
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petition with the Commission, he allowed it to be dismissed for want of pros-
ecution, failed to vacate the dismissal, and failed to inform the client that the
petition had been dismissed. In the ensuing action by the client against the
attorney, the court held that the client had failed to demonstrate a breach of
fiduciary duty by the attorney apart from professional negligence. 83
Although the court acknowledged that malpractice does evidence a breach
of trust, the court held that such a breach "does not mean every cause of
action for professional negligence also sets forth a separate and independent
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty."'84
Similarly, in Bukoskey v. Walter W. Shuham; CPA., P. C 85 the client, an
accounting firm, sued its former attorneys who had drafted trust fund docu-
ments for the accounting firm on behalf of the firm's client, a union.
Although the attorneys were not hired as trustees for the union fund nor to
provide general advisory services to the union, the accounting firm claimed
that the attorneys should have known that the trustees for the union were
not in compliance with certain federal duties and that the attorneys should
have properly advised the trustees regarding such compliance. The account-
ing firm thus sued the attorneys for both malpractice and breach of fiduciary
duty for their alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in drafting the ap-
propriate documents and in advising the union. The court found on these
facts that the claim for breach of fiduciary duty was a "red herring."' 86 The
court found no indication in the record to suggest that the attorneys had
breached their duty of loyalty and fidelity, or had committed any sort of
fraud.87 The court thus held that the only appropriate claim was for legal
malpractice for the alleged negligent misconduct, of the attorneys.88
Although the actions for breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice are thus
distinct from each other, it is, of course, possible for the same set of facts to
give rise to both actions when the circumstances indicate that the attorney
has breached both the appropriate standards of care and of conduct. In
Holmes v. Drucker,89 for example, the plaintiff client brought suit against her
attorney for negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The client had
engaged the attorney to file a personal injury suit. The client's malpractice
claim was based on the attorney's failure to file the lawsuit in a timely man-
ner, and her fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims were based on the
attorney's subsequent misrepresentations and false statements regarding the
timely filing of the suit. The trial court granted actual damages to the client
for the attorney's dilatory conduct, but determined that the wrong was not
committed under circumstances that would justify an award of punitive
damages. Although the attorney's subsequent fraudulent acts and misrepre-
sentations might have justified a punitive damage award, the trial court re-
83. Id. at 1321.
84. Id. at 1321.
85. 666 F. Supp. 181 (D. Alaska 1987).
86. Id. at 184.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 411 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
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fused to hear evidence regarding the client's claims based on that
misconduct, citing the general rule that conduct subsequent to a tort is not
admissible to support a claim for punitive damages.90
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding, finding that the
trial court had erred in not recognizing the client's independent claims of
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in addition to the claim of negligence. 91
The court reasoned that the claim of negligence, in failing to adhere to the
requisite standard of care for filing lawsuits, was completely different from
the causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty based on the
attorney's subsequent misconduct of making false representations to the cli-
ent. 92 Those independent claims, if properly proved, would support an
award of punitive damages. 93
The lesson is thus clear. Just as a contract claim against an attorney for
breach of promise is separate and distinct from tort actions for malpractice
and breach of fiduciary duty, the tort actions themselves are distinct depend-
ing upon the particular misconduct of the attorney. We turn now to an
examination of how these distinct actions for attorney wrongdoing conflict
and overlap in different contexts and with respect to various legal issues. In
particular, we will examine how pleading and proof requirements, recover-
able damages, and applicable statutes of limitations vary with the cause of
action.
VII. PLEADING AND PROOF REQUIREMENTS
A. CONTRACT
The core ingredient of a contract action by a client against his attorney is
breach of promise by the attorney. Accordingly, the client must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence breach of promise, as well as the
other basic ingredients of a contract cause of action, such as foreseeability,
causation, and damages. 94
Frequently courts allow the same set of facts to support causes of action
against attorneys for both malpractice and breach of contract. The theory
behind this line of decision is that, when an attorney commits malprac-
tice, he is liable not only in tort for that negligence, but in contract as
well for breach of an implied promise to perform legal services in a reason-
ably competent manner. 95 For example, Heritage Square Associates v.
90. Id. at 729.
91. Id. at 730.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. b (1981) ("If the injured party
has suffered loss [caused by the breach] but cannot sustain the burden of proving it, only
nominal damages will be awarded.").
95. See, e.g., Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981) (holding that the client may
choose to bring action in either contract or tort unless particular rules applicable to contract
require otherwise); Robbins v. McGuinness, 423 A.2d 897, 899 (Conn. 1979) (upholding a
contract claim against an attorney); Mac's Car City v. DeNigris, 559 A.2d 712, 714 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1989) (applying the contract statute of limitations to a claim by a client against an
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Blum 96 involved a malpractice action within a malpractice action. The cli-
ent sued its attorney Blum for his failure to file a malpractice claim against
the client's former attorney within the three-year tort statute of limitations.
Attorney Blum defended that the client had failed to state a claim because
an alternative remedy of breach of contract, governed by a longer statute of
limitations, remained available to the client against the former attorney. The
court agreed with attorney Blum and dismissed the action against him.97
The court reasoned that the attorney-client relationship creates an implicit
promise by the attorney to perform the agreed legal services in a professional
and competent manner.98 An attorney who commits malpractice is thus lia-
ble not only in tort but for breach of contract as well. 99 Since the contract
action against its previous attorney remained available to the client, any
wrongdoing by attorney Blum had caused the client no injury.'°°
Other courts eschew implied promises as a basis for attorney liability and
allow a breach of contract action for alleged malpractice only where the
attorney can be shown to have breached an express promise to the client.
For example, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that a client may maintain
an action in contract for an attorney's malpractice only "[w]here the act
complained of is a breach of specific terms of the contract without any refer-
ence to the legal duties imposed by law upon the relationship created
thereby." 10  A similar test has been adopted in other jurisdictions. 0 2 In
jurisdictions following the express contract rule, then, the client's petition
should allege with specificity the express promise alleged to have been
breached by the attorney.
A good case in point is the Hale v. Groce 103 decision, which we discussed
attorney where the complaint is "couched in the language of contract"); see also Westport
Bank & Trust Co. v. Corcoran, Mallin & Aresco, 605 A.2d 862, 865 (Conn. 1992) (allowing
contract action against attorneys for failure to conduct a proper title search); Competitive
Food Sys., Inc. v. Laser, 524 N.E.2d 207, 212-13 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (finding client stated all
essential elements of a valid breach of contract claim); Hale, 744 P.2d at 1292 (Or. 1987)(holding third-party, as intended beneficiary of contract between attorney and client, stated
proper contract cause of action against attorney for malpractice).
96. No. CV 91-0117855, 1992 WL 175072 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 1992).




101. Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 716 P.2d 575, 577 (Kan. 1986); see also Malone v.
University of Kan. Medical Ctr., 552 P.2d 885, 888-89 (Kan. 1976); Pittman v. McDowell,
Rice & Smith, 752 P.2d 711, 715 (Kan. App. 1988).
102. See Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901, 904 (W. Va. 1990). In some jurisdictions mal-
practice actions against attorneys are governed by statute. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-570 to -581
(Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West
1982). In these jurisdictions, of course, requirements of pleading and proof will be dictated by
the requirements of the statute.
Still other jurisdictions have made an attempt, largely without success, to distinguish con-
tract and tort actions for malpractice based on the type of damages alleged by the plaintiff-
client, restricting the contract cause of action to those situations where the client alleges only
economic loss and allowing a cause of action in tort for malpractice only where the client can
show personal injury. See Collins v. Reynard, 553 N.E.2d 69, 70-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), rev'd,
607 N.E.2d 1185 (Il. 1992); Fitzgerald v. Congleton, 583 A.2d 595, 597-601 (Vt. 1990).
103. 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987).
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previously.' ° 4 In that case, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover against
an attorney for malpractice as a third-party beneficiary of the retainer con-
tract between the attorney and his client.' 0 5 The attorney had agreed to
prepare testamentary instruments for his client and to include a bequest of
$300,000 to the plaintiff. After the death of the client, the plaintiff discov-
ered that the gift was not included in the testamentary documents. Before
allowing the plaintiff's cause of action, the court carefully examined the
plaintiff's pleadings to ascertain whether the plaintiff had properly pled a
contract cause of action apart from a claim for negligence. 10 6 The court
concluded that he had, finding that the pertinent portion of the complaint
alleged "not that defendant performed his promise negligently, but that he
did not perform it at all.' 107 The court reasoned that, under the allegations
of the complaint, the defendant "might have broken the promise purposely,
or under circumstances that might be a partial or entire defense to a negli-
gence claim."' 0 8 Accordingly, the specificity of the plaintiff's pleadings al-
lowed him to maintain a cause of action in contract against the attorney in
addition to his malpractice claim.'0 9
B. TORT
To prevail in an action against an attorney for the tort of malpractice, I 10 a
client must allege and prove: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach
of a duty arising from the scope of that attorney-client relationship; (3) that
the conduct of the attorney was not that of a reasonable and prudent lawyer;
and (4) that but for the attorney's misconduct the client would not have
suffered damage."I ' Thus, in malpractice actions the burdens of pleading
and proof follow the normal procedural rules. The situation is much differ-
ent once the client has pled the tort of breach of fiduciary duty. Although
the client retains the ordinary burdens of pleading and proof regarding cau-
sation and damages, the attorney has the full burden of proving that she has
not violated her fiduciary obligation - that she has dealt fairly with her
client" l2 and that her actions were not only acceptable but were above
reproach. "13
104. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
105. 744 P.2d at 1292.
106. Id. at 1292-93. The plaintiff's pleadings included the following language: "Defendant
and Rogers [the client] specifically contracted for defendant to draft the trust document with
plaintiff's gift in it. Defendant breached that contract by failing to include the provision for




110. One treatise notes that "[tihe phrase 'legal malpractice' is commonly used to describe
a kind of tortious conduct, but there is little consensus on or even discussion of its meaning."
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 2.
111. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ferguson, 982 F.2d 404, 406-07 (10th Cir. 1991).
112. Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
113. Id.; see also In re Neuschwander, 747 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Kan. 1987); In re Flayer, 611
A.2d 1111, 1118 (N.J. 1992); In re Lundberg's Will, 197 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872-73 (Sur. Ct. 1960);
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis, 426 A.2d 1138, 1142-43 (Pa. 1981).
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Other procedure-related distinctions may be made between the two tort
causes of action. For example, in a malpractice action, where the basis for
the complaint is negligence, contributory or comparative negligence is a
proper defense for the attorney, although the attorney does retain the burden
of pleading and proving the defense."l 4 However, since actions based on a
breach of an attorney's fiduciary obligations are not grounded in negligence,
defenses based on the client's contributory or comparative negligence do not
apply to such actions.115
A most significant distinction between the two tort causes of action is in
the nature of proof necessary for the client to prevail. Because the tort ac-
tion of malpractice sanctions conduct falling below a standard of profes-
sional care and reasonableness, proving violation of this standard requires
expert testimony on the issue of whether the attorney's conduct met the ap-
plicable professional standard.16 However, because an action based on
breach of fiduciary duty raises the issue only of whether the attorney's con-
duct violated rules governing the profession, an expert's testimony is not
required to show violation of those rules. 1 7 This distinction between the
two causes of action is well demonstrated by the court's decision in Badis v.
Martinez." 8 In that case, the trial court dismissed a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty brought by a client against his attorney because the
client-plaintiff had failed to file a certificate, required by state statute for
malpractice actions, verifying expert opinion that the client's claim for mal-
practice was justified. The plaintiff had sued the attorney alleging both mal-
practice and breach of fiduciary duty. On appeal, the court reinstated the
client's claim for breach of fiduciary duty, holding that the verification stat-
ute applied only to a "claim to recover damages for negligence" 1 9 and not
to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.' 20
Similarly, in Johnson v. DeLay 121 the plaintiff retained an attorney to draft
the necessary legal documents for the sale of her business. She subsequently
sued the attorney for malpractice in negligently drafting the documents and
for misrepresentations subsequently made by the attorney to the client re-
garding the legal effect of the documents. Because the plaintiff had failed to
properly qualify her expert witness prior to trial, the trial court directed a
verdict for the defendant attorney. On appeal, the court upheld the trial
court's verdict regarding the malpractice claim but reinstated the client's
114. Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 118, 132 (Wis. 1985).
115. Koral Indus. v. Security-Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 802 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1990);
Isenhower v. Bell, 365 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1963).
116. Barth v. Reagan, 564 N.E.2d 1196, 1201 (Ill. 1990) (explaining that unless common
knowledge exception applied, an expert's testimony was necessary to prove malpractice); see
also Godbout v. Norton, 262 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Minn. 1977) (affirming trial court's holding
that failure to present expert testimony constituted insufficiency of evidence), cert. denied, 437
U.S. 901 (1978).
117. Badis v. Martinez, 819 P.2d 551, 554 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in




121. 809 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
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claim based on the attorney's misrepresentations. 122 The court properly
concluded that claims based on an attorney's misrepresentations did not go
to professional competence, and thus did not require expert testimony, but
were instead claims that a "jury could rightfully decide, without the benefit
of expert testimony." 123
VIII. REMEDIES FOR BREACH
The basic remedy for either breach of contract or tort is the remedy at law
of money damages. Both the purpose and limitation of the remedy of dam-
ages is compensation, meaning that the aggrieved party may recover for the
loss suffered, but the recovery may not exceed that amount. 124 Compensa-
tion theory, of course, differs for contract and tort. In contract, the theory is
that the promise should have been performed or the breach should not have
occurred, and thus the basic rule is that damages should be measured so as
to put the injured party in the position that would have been occupied had
the contract been performed. 125 The tort theory of compensation is con-
verse, that the tort should not have occurred, and thus the rule is that dam-
ages should be measured so as to put the injured party in the immediate pre-
tort monetary position; the position the aggrieved party would have occu-
pied had the tort not occurred. 126 Damages for breach of contract include
losses directly resulting from the breach so long as such losses were reason-
ably within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the
contract. 127 Tort damages, on the other hand, extend to all losses proxi-
mately caused by a breach of duty and, unlike contract damages, may in-
clude punitive damages as well. 128
Since breach of a fiduciary obligation is a tort, the normal tort damage
remedies are available to the aggrieved client. However, the client is also
entitled to certain extraordinary relief. For example, an attorney who vio-
lates his fiduciary duty is not entitled to any compensation for services ren-
dered to the client under the retainer contract. 129 Further, an attorney who
profits through a breach of his fiduciary obligation will be held accountable
to his client for that profit regardless of whether the breach caused the client
a loss or was in any way at the expense of the client. 130 Extraordinary equi-
table remedies such as constructive trust, equitable lien, and rules of tracing
122. Id. at 555.
123. Id.
124. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (2d ed. 1993).
125. See Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 1432, 1477 (1985); E. Allen Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970).
126. See John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling
Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1150 (1988); see also PROSSER, supra
note 60, § 1.
127. The root case for this proposition is, of course, Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156
Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
128. See PROSSER, supra note 60, § 1.
129. See In re Estate of Lee, 9 N.W.2d 245, 251 (Minn'. 1943).
130. See GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.11, at 141 (1978).
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are available to the client to disgorge the profit from the hands of the attor-
ney.'"' The theory that justifies allowing recovery to the client in such cases
is that retention of the benefit by the fiduciary is clearly unjust, and since no
injury has occurred, no one will be able to maintain action against the attor-
ney unless restitution is granted to the client.' 32
Although availability to the client of these restitution remedies exists for
any breach of fiduciary duty, they usually arise in conflict of interest cases.
For example, in one case, after first mortgage participation certifications had
been issued for the financing of the construction of a hotel, the hotel corpo-
ration was placed in receivership.' 33 A trustee was appointed to hold the
mortgage property for the benefit of the certificate holders. Subsequently,
attorneys for the trustee purchased some of the certificates at a fraction of
their face value. Some time later the trustee made partial distributions to the
certificate holders (including the attorneys) greatly in excess of the amount
which the attorneys had paid for the certificates. The result was that the
attorneys received an enormous profit from their investment and still re-
tained the certificates themselves. It was undisputed that the purchases by
the attorneys were with the knowledge of their client, the trustee, and with-
out fraud, bad faith, or manipulation of the trust by the attorneys.
Nevertheless, because the attorneys were in a fiduciary relation to the cer-
tificate holders, the court held that the attorneys would hold the certificates
in constructive trust for the benefit of the trust estate.' 34 Further, the attor-
neys were ordered to account to the trustee for the amount of any profit they
had made on the certificate investment and to transfer title to the certificates
to the trustee upon repayment of the amount the attorneys had invested in
the certificates.' 35 The court held that the attorneys had breached a duty of
"undivided loyalty" and thus "the question of bad faith or damage is irrele-
vant." 36 Finally, the court reasoned that an actual conflict of interest was
not necessary and that it was enough that the personal purposes of the attor-
neys "might" conflict with those of the trust beneficiaries. ' 37 The net result
is thus that, in an action for breach of fiduciary duty, the client may recover
from the breaching attorney amounts well in excess of any losses suffered by
the client and even where no loss has been suffered at all.
In the garden variety actions for malpractice and breach of contract, the
client is limited to compensatory damages. However, under the current
trend in judicial decisions, some question exists as to whether aggrieved cli-
ents will continue to be allowed to recover in tort for economic losses caused
131. Id. § 2.11, at 141-47.
132. Id. §2.11, at 141.
133. In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 103 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1952).
134. Id. at 725.
135. Id. at 727.
136. Id. at 725.
137. Id.; see also David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 345 (Ct. App.
1988) (awarding constructive trust in the amount of $350,000 to client against attorneys for
profits earned by attorneys through wrongful use of confidential information and procedures
learned from client, even though profits were earned after the attorney-client relationship had
ended).
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by the malpractice of their attorneys. The so-called "economic loss" doc-
trine has been developed by the courts over the past decade or so in what is
probably a vain attempt to distinguish and keep separate contract and tort
actions. The rule is that, where the plaintiff's injury is solely economic in
nature, recovery may be had in contract but not in tort.1 38 The rule is fol-
lowed in numerous jurisdictions and the Supreme Court of the United States
has sanctioned the rule with the reasoning that, without its application, the
law of contract would "drown in a sea of tort."' 139 The question is a provoc-
ative one because most losses caused by attorney wrongdoing are economic
in nature.
The Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the economic loss doctrine in
Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. 140 The Moorman deci-
sion led to speculation among commentators as to how the economic loss
doctrine would play out in subsequent litigation involving various types of
service contracts, including malpractice claims against attorneys.141 The Il-
linois Supreme Court finally addressed that issue in Collins v. Reynard,142
initially concluding that the economic loss doctrine did indeed apply to mal-
practice claims. 143 The plaintiff-client had employed an attorney to negoti-
ate and consummate an installment sale of her business. The client later
sued the attorney for negligent performance of legal services, alleging that
the attorney had improperly drafted or approved a sales contract that failed
138. A representative line of cases from the Supreme Court of Texas developing the eco-
nomic loss doctrine is: Nobility Homes v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977) (adopting
the economic loss doctrine on the reasoning that damages in tort and in contract should be
kept separate); Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Servs., Inc., 572
S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978) (denying tort claim under economic loss doctrine where defect in
product caused damages only to product itself; proper claim was for breach of warranty not
strict liability); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. 1978)
(finding that where defect in product caused damages only to product itself the proper claim
was for breach of warranty not strict liability; but where defect in product caused injury not
merely to the product itself but to surrounding property as well, loss was not merely economic
and recovery could be had in a tort claim for strict liability), overruled by, Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456,
459 (Tex. 1980) (allowing damages for personal injury allowed in contract/warranty action
because UCC §§ 2-314 and 2-715 permit such recovery); see also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991) (holding that in a service contract case, if only
loss is economic resulting from a failure to perform a contractual obligation, action does not
sound in tort and recovery may be had only for breach of contract); William E. Marple, Requi-
escat for an Epitaph: Breach of Contract is Not a Tort, 56 TEX. B.J. 656, 659 (1993). See
generally Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: Another Look at Rob-
ins Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 275 (1991).
139. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
140. 435 N.E.2d 443, 449 (Ill. 1982).
141. See Blanche M. Manning, Legal Malpractice. Is It Tort or Contract?, 21 Loy. L.J.
741, 743 (1990); see also Timothy L. Bertschy, Negligent Performance of Service Contracts and
the Economic Loss Doctrine, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 249, 261-78 (1984); Mark K. Fried-
lander, The Impact of Moorman and its Progeny on Construction Litigation, 77 ILL. B.J. 654,
656 (1989); Kelly M. Hnatt, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery, 73 IOWA L.
REV. 1181, 1186 (1988); Steven G. M. Stein et al., A Blueprint for the Duties and Liabilities of
Design Professionals After Moorman, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 187-89 (1984).
142. 607 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1992).
143. Collins v. Reynard, No. 70325, 1991 III. LEXIS 104, at *12-15 (Il. Oct. 31, 1991)
(opinion withdrawn after rehearing).
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to carry out her intention of retaining a perfected purchase money security
interest in the business. The buyer had defaulted on the installment contract
after pledging the assets of the business to another creditor, who was able to
foreclose on his security interest and take possession of the assets. The client
claimed that the damages resulting from the attorney's negligence included
all sums remaining unpaid under the installment contract, including interest,
as well as cost of collection and attorney's fees.
The court correctly noted that all of these damages were economic in na-
ture and held that the economic loss doctrine barred plaintiff's tort claim. 44
Any claim that the plaintiff might have had was for breach of contract be-
cause, reasoned the court, contract law "provides a superior basis to tort law
for the resolution of issues concerning the failed expectations of clients of
professionals where only economic loss is sought to be recovered."1 45 The
court expressed concern that to allow recovery in tort would expose profes-
sionals to unlimited and unforeseen damages.146 The court's conclusion was
in the teeth of a vigorous dissenting opinion, which argued that the eco-
nomic loss doctrine was entirely inappropriate for malpractice actions be-
cause the doctrine is grounded on the notion that the complaining party
should have bargained for protection in the event of breach when the parties
negotiated the terms of the contract. 147 Presumptions of arms length bar-
gaining between a fiduciary and principal, particularly attorney and client,
undermine the most basic tenets of the law of fiduciary obligation."48 The
dissent suggested that the decision of the majority would "find a warm re-
ception among those who are eager to see the practice of law transformed
from a learned profession into a trade, with the respective rights and duties
of the parties bartered for in advance of a contract for legal
representation." 49
On further reflection, the Supreme Court of Illinois granted a rehearing in
the Collins case and reversed its previous position, holding that a client may
recover damages for economic loss against an attorney in either tort or con-
tract.150 Although the court did criticize the economic loss doctrine gener-
ally as a method of distinguishing tort and contract actions, the court did
not abandon the doctrine but merely carved out an exception for legal mal-
practice claims.' 5' The court reached its conclusion based on what it termed
historical precedent rather than logic, noting that if something has been han-
dled in a certain way for a-long time and if it is reasonable to continue to do
so, then the method should continue unless good cause is shown.1
52
144. Id. at *15.
145. Id. at *14.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *25 (Miller, C. J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Id. at *27.
150. Collins, 607 N.E.2d at 1186.
151. Id. at 1187.
152. Id. at 1186. Justice Jackson put it more succinctly: "The mere fact that a path is a
beaten one is a persuasive reason for following it." Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit
- The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45'COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (1945).
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Thus, in Illinois a bullet fired by the nonsense inherent in the economic
loss doctrine was dodged. It remains to be seen how the many other juris-
dictions that follow the doctrine will handle the issue. Although at least one
of us would find comfort in the prospect of the law of tort drowning in a sea
of contract,153 no one seriously believes that the economic loss doctrine
sounds the death knell anywhere for tort actions for malpractice. We sus-
pect, however, that it will be at least a decade more before the courts will
abandon the doctrine and its silliness, and in the meantime the likelihood is
that, when faced with the question, the courts elsewhere will follow the Illi-
nois lead by simply making malpractice claims an exception to the rule.
154
IX. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Time periods in statutes of limitations applicable to each of the three
causes of action potentially available to clients for attorney wrongdoing may
vary significantly. This heightens the necessity for claimants to frame their
actions in terms of the appropriate cause. It also heightens the need for
courts to make certain that the appropriate cause is indeed correctly framed,
so that claimants are given relief as allowed by law or denied relief as the
applicable statute requires. As a rule, contract statutes of limitations begin
to run at the time of breach and are longer than those for tort.1 55 The tort
statutes are more apt to be a major bar to a client's successful action against
an attorney, because of the limited time period allowed for bringing the ac-
tion, and because of the difficulty in discovering both the attorney's wrong-
doing and the injury thereby caused.' 56 However, statutes applicable to
actions based on the tort of breach of fiduciary duty typically provide for
much longer time periods than malpractice, or even contract, statutes.
Thus, a claimant may successfully recover for breach of fiduciary duty even
though her tort or contract claims have long since become time barred.'
57
153. That "one" is, of course, Anderson. Steele suggests that we at least clarify the meta-
phor by citing to our previous quotation of Justice Blackmun. See supra note 139 and accom-
panying text.
154. Another possibility is represented by a rule adopted in New Jersey which makes an
exception to the doctrine in cases involving "special relationships." The relationship between
attorney and client would certainly qualify for exception. See People Express Airlines v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 112 (N.J. 1985).
155. See DAVID I. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 5.2, at 67 (1980). Historically, most courts found a legal malpractice action as essentially ex
contractu and thus subject to the contract statute of limitations. See Wilcox v. Executors of
Plummer, 29 U.S. 172, 174 (1830); Sitton v. Clements, 385 F.2d 869, 870 (6th Cir. 1967);
Barrett v. Burt, 250 F. Supp. 904, 905 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Wheaton v. Nolan, 39 P.2d 457, 457
(Cal. Ct. App. 1934); Juhnke v. Hess, 506 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Kan. 1973); Hendrickson v. Sears,
310 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Mass. 1974); Hillhouse v. McDowell, 410 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tenn. 1966);
A.T. Burce & Co. v. Baxter, 75 Tenn. 477, 479 (1881); Jones v. Gregory, 215 P. 63, 64 (Wash.
1923). An occasional case continues to hold that an action for malpractice is contractual in
nature and may not be brought in tort. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 244 S.E.2d 177, 180
(N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
156. For this reason, some courts have adopted a discovery rule for malpractice actions,
holding that the statute does not begin to run until the client discovered or should have discov-
ered the wrong. See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1988). The Willis case is
discussed more fully in the next section. See infra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
157. See Gerdes v. Estate of Cush, 953 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Most courts have demonstrated a marked solicitude for the legal profes-
sion's interests in malpractice cases by carefully ascertaining that a breach of
fiduciary duty is correctly pled and proved before allowing the client access
to the longer statutes of limitation available for breach of fiduciary duty and
contract actions. Otherwise, reason the courts, the policy considerations un-
derlying shorter tort statutes would be effectively neutered by the simple
expedient of allowing clients unfettered access to longer limitation periods
for contract or for breach of fiduciary duty. 158 For example, in Gerdes v.
Estate of Cush 159 the court held that, because the evidence failed to support
a finding that the attorney had engaged in self-dealing or a breach of loyalty
to his client, the client's cause of action must be based solely on the attor-
ney's alleged negligence and was thereby subject to a one-year statute of
limitations rather than the ten-year statute governing breaches of fiduciary
duty.160 Similarly, in Fitzgerald v. Congleton 161 the Vermont Supreme
Court held that claims by a client for damages for mental anguish, emotional
distress, and personal humiliation 62 were time barred by the applicable tort
statute, but allowed the client recovery for economic losses, which the court
reasoned were governed by the longer contract statute of limitations. 63
Clearly, then, the applicable statute of limitations may be a vital factor in
determining which of the three potential causes of action a client might
bring against her attorney. 64 Because of the typically shorter statute of lim-
itations for tort actions, more and more clients will likely attempt to frame
their actions against attorneys in contract or, where applicable, for breach of
fiduciary duty. The avenue for contract actions will be particularly wide in
those jurisdictions that regard the attorney-client relationship as the genesis
for an implied promise by the attorney of competent performance. In those
jurisdictions, as we have previously discussed, 65 contract actions for attor-
158. Some states avoid the potential inequities in applying different statutes of limitations
by making claims for attorney malpractice a statutory cause of action. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§§ 6-5-570 to -581 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980); CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 340.6 (West 1982).
159. 953 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992).
160. Id. at 205. Some courts, however, have failed to recognize the important differences
between actions for breach of fiduciary duty and for legal malpractice and have applied the
same procedural and pleading requirements as for all torts. These courts classify the breach of
fiduciary duty as simply a type of legal malpractice. For example, see Estate of Degley v.
Vega, 797 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). The Degley case is
discussed more fully in the next section. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
161. 583 A.2d 595, 600-01 (Vt. 1990).
162. Clients often claim loss of business opportunities, lost profits and other economic
damages in malpractice actions, but rarely make claims for physical or emotional injury or for
other tort-like damages.
163. Fitzgerald, 583 A.2d at 601. The court described the losses from costs to regain cus-
tody of the plaintiff's child, including attorney's fees, as economic losses governed by the
state's six-year statute of limitations. Id.
164. See, e.g., Juhnke v. Hess, 506 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Kan. 1973) (applying contract statute
of limitations where client pled breach of contract in action against attorney); Bland v. Smith,
277 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tenn. 1955) (applying tort statute of limitations where plaintiff claimed
personal injury); Family Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157, 160 (W. Va. 1974)
(applying tort statute of limitations to plaintiff's claim for negligence).
165. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
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ney wrongdoing are co-extensive with tort actions because the malpractice
that gives rise to the tort also represents a breach of the attorney's implied
promise regarding competence. For example, in Santulli v. Englert, Reilly &
McHugh, P.C. 166 the court allowed the client to proceed against his attorney
for malpractice under a claim for breach of contract even though there was
no breach of a specific promise other than the implied promise to perform in
a competent manner.' 67 However, taking cognizance that the client's tort
action was time barred and that the contract action allowed access to a
longer limitations period, the court limited the client's recovery to only the
economic losses normally recoverable for breach of contract.' 68
X. JUDICIAL FAILURE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE
DISTINCTIONS
Courts at times do not make pertinent distinctions among the various
causes of action for attorney wrongdoing. When that failure is intentional
and is based upon proper policy considerations, the failure becomes con-
scious refusal and is rational.169 However, when it is simply a failure result-
ing from ignorance, a lack of awareness, or other inadvertence, then the
rights of the parties may be balanced akimbo and the ultimate decisions
unjust.
A telling example of this inadvertence is a line of cases in the intermediate
appellate courts of Texas. Ironically, the root authority for the courts' mis-
guidance is the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Willis v. Maver-
ick.170 The irony is that, under any fair reading, Willis is a well reasoned
166. 586 N.E.2d 1014 (N.Y. 1992).
167. Id. at 1016. Other courts have held that the mere existence of an attorney-client rela-
tionship gives rise to an implied promise by the attorney to render professional services compe-
tently. See In re Hegstrom, 736 P.2d 370, 371-72 (Ariz. 1987); Heritage Square Assocs. v.
Blum, No. CV 91-0117855, 1992 WL 175072, *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 1992).
168. Santulli, 586 N.E.2d at 1016; see also Heritage Square Assocs., 1992 WL 1750752 at
*6. In that case the court held that a former client could sue an attorney either for negligence,
governed by a three-year statute of limitations, or for breach of contract, governed by a six-
year statute of limitations. Id. The court found an implicit contractual promise in attorney-
client relationships that the attorney will perform the required services in a professional and
competent manner. Id. According to the court, the breach of that promise supports a breach
of contract claim even though negligent performance might also support an action for tort. Id.
But see Hale, 744 P.2d at 1292 (suggesting that having causes of action in both tort and con-
tract, with different statutes of limitations and distinct rules of procedure is nonsensical; and
calling for legislative intervention); Bales for Food, Inc. v. Poole, 424 P.2d 892, 893 (Or. 1967)
(criticizing the existence of a distinction between the limitations periods in the different causes
of action). Quoting Prosser, the Bales court said that "there has been a failure to think the
thing through and the courts have been little concerned with principles while preoccupied with
the problem at hand." Bales for Food, 424 P.2d at 893-94 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
THE BORDERLAND OF TORTS AND CONTRACT, SELECTED ToPics ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
451-52 (1953)). Finally, the Bales court opined that "there is a need for change in the law
relating to the limitation of actions, but we think that the change should come through legisla-
tion rather than by a judicial effort to make refinements such as plaintiff suggests in this case."
Id. at 894.
169. For example, the requirement by some courts that a contract action for attorney mal-
practice be based on an express promise is an example of rational choice. See supra notes 101-
09 and accompanying text.
170. 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
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opinion wherein the court, after a careful policy analysis, rendered a decision
balancing the interests of clients and attorneys in favor of clients in malprac-
tice cases. The issue before the court was when the relevant statute of limita-
tions should begin to run in a negligence suit brought by a client for attorney
malpractice. The court adopted the so-called "discovery rule," holding that
the statute does not begin to run until the client discovers or should have
discovered the lawyer's misconduct. 171 In reaching its decision, the court
eschewed the normal Texas rule in personal injury cases that the statute
begins to run from the moment of injury. 172
The court justified its decision on the basis of the unique and compelling
nature of the attorney-client relationship. 7 3 The court emphasized that an
attorney is required to use the high level of skill and diligence required of a
practitioner of the legal profession and opined that it would be unrealistic to
expect a lay person client to have similar legal acumen and knowledge neces-
sary to perceive an attorney's wrongdoing at the moment of its occur-
rence. 174 Discovery will often occur much later, usually after the fiduciary
relationship has ended. Indeed, because the attorney is obligated to make
full disclosure of all relevant facts pertaining to the. client's case, the client
will reasonably feel free to rely on the attorney, and suspicion of wrongdoing
will often not naturally occur during the term of the relationship.175 Thus,
reasoned the court, adopting the general rule of accrual at the time of injury
would unfairly require a client to ascertain malpractice at the instant of its
occurrence and would absurdly necessitate his hiring a second attorney to
observe the work of the first.176 Accordingly, the court concluded that any
burden placed on the attorney by the adoption of the discovery rule would
be less onerous than the injustice of denying recovery to victims who are
unaware of the misconduct.177
Willis is a well crafted decision in favor of clients. Most importantly, the
client had made no allegations of breach of contract nor of breach of fiduci-
ary duty, 178 so the court was speaking only to causes of action for malprac-
tice. In that context, the court quite naturally said that a "cause of action
for legal malpractice is in the nature of a tort and is thus governed by the
two-year limitations statute."' 179
Unfortunately, other courts in Texas have subsequently taken that lan-
guage out of its context, concluding that claims by clients, whether sound-
ing in malpractice, contract, or breach of fiduciary duty, are in the nature
of tort. Perhaps the misreading is seductive because it allows the courts
171. Id. at 644-46.
172. Id. at 644; see also Marino v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990);
WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III, ADVANCED LITIGATION GUIDE, TORT ACTIONS § 72.03 1[l][b]
(1992).
173. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 645.
174. Id. (citing Ward, supra note 14, at 613).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 646.
177. Id.; see also Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tex. 1977).
178. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 646.
179. Id. at 644.
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to lump various causes of action into one, and to avoid the difficult, and
sometimes quite subtle, distinctions that would be required for a case-
by-case analysis of different causes of action. For example, in Pham v.
Nguyen 180 clients sued their attorney alleging both negligence and breach of
contract. Relying on Willis, the court held that an action for malpractice is
in the nature of tort regardless of how the suit is framed and that the two-
year statute of limitations thus applied.'t8 The clients prevailed in the case
because their tort claim remained viable under the discovery rule applicable
to malpractice actions sounding in tort even though four years had passed
since the malpractice. 82
The client was, however, not so fortunate in Estate of Degley v. Vega, t 83
where the court held that actions for malpractice and breach of fiduciary
duty were to be treated the same for statute of limitations purposes. 8 4 The
estate had filed a motion against its former attorney to recover allegedly
excess legal fees charged to the estate for its administration. The surviving
widow had executed two secured notes to the attorney for his fees. The
widow alleged that she had agreed only to pay a reasonable fee, that the fees
charged were unreasonable, and that the attorney had fraudulently induced
the widow into executing the two notes. The trial court, however, found
that the fee charged was not excessive and that no fraud, overreaching, or
breach of fiduciary duty had occurred. 85 On appeal, the court upheld the
judgment of the trial court and, relying on the Willis and Pham decisions,
reaffirmed the notion that, regardless of the nature of the claim, an action for
malpractice sounds only in tort. t86
Other Texas cases have continued this "lumping" approach to malprac-
tice actions against attorneys. ' 87 We do concede, however, that all of the
cases to date may have reached the correct result. Texas has no separate
statute of limitations applicable to actions against fiduciaries. Tort actions,
including actions for breach of fiduciary duty, are governed by a two-year
statute, 88 ameliorated by the case law encrustation of a discovery rule.
However, contract actions in Texas, although accruing at the time of breach
rather than the discovery thereof, are governed by a four-year statute. 18 9
Under the lumping approach, a contract action for malpractice will presum-
180. 763 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
181. Id. at 469.
182. Id. at 470.
183. 797 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
184. Id. at 302.
185. For this reason, we do not quarrel with the result of the case but only with the court's
analysis and, particularly, its reading of Willis.
186. Estate of Degley, 797 S.W.2d at 302-03.
187. See American Medical Elecs. v. Korn, 819 SW.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991,
writ denied); see also Woodburn v. Turley, 625 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1980); Sledge v. Alsup,
759 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ); Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809, 813-14
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ); Gabel v. Sandoval, 648 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, writ dism'd); Citizens State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 386 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
188. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
189. Id. § 16.004.
19941
SMU LAW REVIEW
ably be treated as in the nature of tort, and thus subject to the two-year
statute of limitations. The necessary effect will be to deny a right of action in
Texas to a client who brings suit more than two years after discovering the
wrong but less than four years after its occurrence.
That inequity was recognized in Jampole v. Matthews. 190 In Jampole, on
the eve of settlement of the suit for which attorney Matthews had been re-
tained, Matthews persuaded client Jampole to increase the contingent fee
payable to him in the event of settlement from thirty-three to forty percent.
More than two years after the settlement was paid, Jampole sued Matthews
seeking damages for paying a fee higher than that called for by the retainer
agreement, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of
the state consumer protection statute, and fraud. Matthews was granted
summary judgment by the trial court in response to his argument that the
cause of action, no matter the label given it, was for malpractice and was
thus barred by the two-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the court
reversed.
Noting that in Willis there were no allegations of fraud or breach of con-
tract, the appellate court refused to interpret that decision as mandating that
all malpractice actions, regardless of their nature, be governed by the two-
year statute of limitations. 19 Instead, the court reasoned that actions for
attorney wrongdoing sounding in contract, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty
should be distinguished from actions alleging negligent legal practice. 192
These other actions would be governed by the applicable four-year statute of
limitations, while only the negligence action would be subject to the two-
year statute. 193
We think that the decision of the court of appeals in Jampole is correct.
We submit that allowing incidentals such as statutes of limitations, kinds of
damages suffered, and other peripherals to determine the nature of a client's
action against her attorney for malpractice is to ignore traditional distinc-
tions between causes of action, to misread or ignore cases like Willis, Hale v.
Groce,194 and their progeny (cases reaching their results only after careful
analysis of the nuances of the attorney-client relationship), and to turn juris-
prudence on its head. The traditional distinctions among causes of action
were at issue in the recent case of Peeler v. Hughes & Luce. 195 The client,
who had been convicted of tax fraud, sued her former attorneys, who had
represented her in defending the criminal prosecution, alleging that they had
failed to inform her of an offer of immunity from the prosecution and instead
had encouraged her to sign a plea bargain agreement admitting criminal
guilt. On the recommendation of her attorneys, she did plead guilty and was
190. 857 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
191. Id. at 61.
192. Id. at 62.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 8-17, 63-75, 103-09, and 170-79 and accompanying text.
195. Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, No. 05-92-01541-CV, 1993 WL 398875 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Oct. 11, 1993, n.w.h.). The decision in this case was reached while this article was in galley.
We appreciate the courtesy of our editors in allowing us to include a brief analysis of the case.
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given a probated sentence and a fine. In the subsequent suit against her
attorneys, the client alleged various causes of action including negligence,
gross negligence and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary
judgment on all claims in favor of the defendant attorneys.
On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the client's
malpractice claims. 196 Citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions, 197
the court on appeal held that a client who is adjudicated guilty of a crime
cannot recover against her former attorneys for negligence in defending the
criminal prosecution unless the client can prove her innocence of the under-
lying criminal offense.' 98 The court reasoned that an action for malpractice
requires a showing that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the cli-
ent's conviction. 199 Unless the client can establish her innocence, the con-
viction must stand as the result of her guilt rather than of her attorney's
negligence. 2 ° °
In the trial court, the client had alleged an action for breach of contract,
upon which the court also granted summary judgment for the defendant
attorneys. Because the client did not appeal the contract claim, the appellate
court did not have to address the issue of causation in the context of a con-
tract action. The court, however, discussed at some length a recent decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,20 1 which held that a client who could
not prove innocence of the underlying conviction so as to satisfy the proxi-
mate causation requirement for a malpractice action could, nevertheless, re-
cover against her attorneys for breach of contract, needing to prove "only
that he had an agreement with the attorney and did not receive the benefits
of representation to which he was entitled under the contract. ' 20 2 We ques-
tion this conclusion. We fail to see how a client who cannot prove that her
attorney's incompetence caused her criminal conviction may nevertheless
prove that the attorney's failure to honor his promise to represent her com-
petently could have caused that conviction. 20 3 Thus, if one accepts the rea-
196. Id. at *12.
197. Id. at *5-7. The court noted that the question of causation in malpractice actions
against criminal defense attorneys had not been definitively addressed by the Texas courts. Id.
at *4.
198. Id. at *8.
199. Id.
200. Id. This reasoning is rather circular. Who is to say that even a guilty client would
have been adjudicated guilty had her attorney not been guilty of malpractice? And even an
innocent client may as a tactical matter accept a bargain to plead guilty in exchange for a light
sentence and the opportunity to avoid the unpleasantness of a criminal trial.
The court also based its decision on policy concerns that a criminal not be allowed to profit
from her criminal acts. Id. at *9. Presumably these concerns would only bar a criminal client
from recovering punitive damages (and possibly damages for non-pecuniary losses such as
mental suffering), but not purely compensatory damages, in an action based on her attorney's
wrongdoing in defending her criminal prosecution. Purely compensatory damages would rep-
resent no profit to the criminal client.
201. Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993).
202. Peeler, 1993 WL 398875, at *7 (citing Bailey, 621 A.2d at 115).
203. The causation requirement in contract law is, in the present context, very similar to
that in the law of tort. Simply stated, an aggrieved party may recover only for losses caused by
the breach of contract. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, 841 (2d ed. 1990)
("There is, of course, a fundamental requirement, similar to that imposed in tort cases, that the
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soning regarding causation in the tort action, the same reasoning would
apply equally to the contract action.
Regardless, in Peeler this reasoning would not have applied to bar an ac-
tion against the attorney for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to advise the
client of an offer of immunity from prosecution. The client could certainly
maintain without any proof of innocence of the underlying conviction that
"but for" the nondisclosure, she would have accepted the offer and thereby
avoided both the ensuing prosecution and the resulting conviction. In fact, a
disclosure of an offer of immunity would be particularly attractive to a guilty
client. Unfortunately for the client in Peeler, a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against her former attorneys was not before the court.
The three causes of actions we have discussed herein contemplate different
underlying conduct, and they each balance differently the rights of the par-
ties. Each cause of action has its own subset of incidentals designed to facili-
tate a proper adjustment of competing interests. Admittedly, a rigid
enforcement of these distinctions may occasionally result in a worthy plain-
tiff being denied appropriate relief because of a mistake in choosing one
cause of action rather than another. 2° 4 However, such a result inevitably
follows from an incorrect selection and is a necessary concomitant to having
a choice among alternatives. Choosing the correct cause of action is a bur-
den in all litigation.
Certainly, legal malpractice actions often fall on that "borderland of tort
and contract, '20 5 and commentators have documented that traditional
boundaries of contract and tort have for some time been merging into a crea-
ture called "contort. ' 20 6 If expediency calls for a lumping approach, at least
breach of contract be the cause in fact of the loss, although [as in tort] the presence of other
contributing causes may not preclude recovery."). Professor Farnsworth quotes Texasgulf v.
United Gas Pipe Line, 610 F. Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1985) to the effect that if the "defendant's
breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, the defendant is not relieved in whole or in
part from liability by the existence of other contributing causes." FARNSWORTH, supra,
§ 12.1, at 841
204. Where a party has two or more remedies for enforcement of a right, the fact
that one remedy is barred by the statute of limitations does not bar the other
remedies. However, where a plaintiff elects one of two remedies and such action
is barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff is bound by his election and
cannot thereafter resort to the other remedy for which a different limitation is
provided.
Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926, 928 (Miss. 1982) (referring to plaintiff-client in a legal
malpractice action).
205. See PROSSER, supra note 168, at 380. Some courts rather openly manipulate the facts
in order to sustain the plaintiff's choice of cause of action.
This manipulation seems preferable to the alternative of barring an injured
party's claim, but it is not the most rational or effective means of distributing
justice, because a plaintiff's chance of success depends less on the merits of his
claim than on the resourcefulness of counsel and the willingness of the court to
read the facts and the law in a favorable light.
Jonathon M. Albano, Note, Contorts: Patrolling the Borderland of Contract and Tort in Legal
Malpractice Actions, 22 B.C. L. REV. 545, 545 (1981).
206. See generally Albano, supra note 205; GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974); Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract? Inductions From a
Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-Party Insurance Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330
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the rules of the game should be known in advance, not applied ex post facto,
and be concocted only after careful consideration of the vagaries, the nu-
ances, and the equities of the available alternatives.
Causes of action evolve to form a paradigm tailored to distinct fact pat-
terns so that repeatedly uniform and just results are achieved among parties
who litigate within that paradigm. This artifact of well-ordered jurispru-
dence is defeated when courts allow a choice of causes of actions based, not
on the conduct at issue in the litigation, but instead on what incidental trap-
pings of a particular cause of action better suit the litigant's side of the case.
Courts then are forced to merely square doctrine with result based on the
claimant's choice, whether fortuitous or calculated, and the risk is that fun-
damental equities will be ignored. For example, one court, apparently
armed with the conviction that the distinction between a tort action and one
sounding in contract is quite clear, ruled that, where an attorney was em-
ployed to obtain a child support order but only partially performed the
agreement, the correct cause of action was for breach of contract. 20 7 As a
result, presumably distinguishing poor performance from non-performance,
the former governed by contract and the latter tort, the court ruled that the
appropriate action sui generis was for breach of contract, and the contract
statute of limitations thus applied. 208 However, a detached observer might
equally well conclude that the attorney's poor performance in the case was
an act of negligent malpractice instead of, or at least more than, a breach of
contract. 20 9 It is naive to assume that courts can, across the broad spec-




No one need apologize for the attempts of our courts to formulate a body
of law that emphasizes lawyer obligations and that imposes harsh sanctions
for violations of a client's trust.211 However, at present, abstract differences
among the various causes of action available for attorney wrongdoing in
terms of pleading requirements, problems of proof, available defenses, appli-
(1980); Richard E. Spiedel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Con-
tract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975).
207. Pittman v. McDowell, Rice & Smith, 752 P.2d 711, 718 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988).
208. Id.
209. Cf Wascom v. State Farm Ins. Co., 517 So. 2d 228, 231 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (drawing
a distinction between malpractice by malfeasance and malpractice by nonfeasance).
210. See, e.g., Long v. Buckley, 629 P.2d 557, 559 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that
attorney malpractice actions are governed by tort, not contract, statutes of limitations); Hill-
house v. McDowell, 410 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tenn. 1966) (holding that client's action against
attorney for failure to prosecute personal injury suit within statute of limitations was not gov-
erned by one-year personal injury statute of limitations, but rather by the six-year statute relat-
ing to contracts).
211. Cf Roy R. Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Ethics and the Law of Contract Juxta-
posed: A Jaundiced View of Professional Responsibility Considerations in the Attorney-Client
Relationship, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 791, 802-03 (1991) (arguing that the profession is ham-
pered by suffocating standards imposed upon attorneys and that the profession may not indeed




cable damage rules, and other nuances of trial procedure have made the ef-
fort of litigating attorney misconduct an illogical and sometimes
impenetrable morass.
As things presently work, making the correct choice among causes of ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty, for negligent malpractice, and for breach of
contract is critical. Too often that choice of law is made on an ad hoc or
accidental basis, or is superficially imposed by the courts, because differences
between the causes of actions are misunderstood by lawyers representing ag-
grieved clients and by courts adjudicating their claims. In this article we
have attempted to demonstrate that each of the causes of action has distinct
advantages and disadvantages to both client and lawyer. Conceptionally the
law of fiduciary obligation is static, ancient, and steady; while the law of
malpractice changes and evolves over time with changes in the normative
habits of lawyers. Furthermore, fiduciary obligations are sui generis and ab-
solute, while the malpractice obligation of reasonable care is only relative
and fact specific. 2 12
Thus, choice of law and the availability of that choice are more than sim-
ply normative in the scheme of things. The current system of misunderstood
causes of action and inconsistent results, as well as the split among courts in
allowing malpractice actions in tort or contract, has caused great confusion
among practitioners in this area of the law and has failed to provide effective
enforcement mechanisms to redress clients' injuries for wrongs committed
by their attorneys. All of the heroic notions of professionalism and dedica-
tion that ostensibly mark the legal profession (at least in the eyes of lawyers
themselves) are meaningless without logical and effective enforcement
mechanisms.
The legal profession, priding itself in its self regulation, has a tremendous
responsibility to make discerning policy decisions so as to better define the
ways in which meaningful rights may be provided to clients. As the volume
of legal litigation malpractice continues to grow, the need for consistency
and equity in the cause or causes available to clients also grows. It seems to
us much more logical to classify legal malpractice as a hybrid of tort and
contract and to establish a consistent set of rules, perhaps by statute, for
212. Here we are referring to the distinction long made by jurists between discretionary
and nondiscretionary rules of law. Generally speaking, malpractice actions are governed by
discretionary rules, while breaches of fiduciary obligations are subject to nondiscretionary rules
of law. The application of discretionary rules is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of
the particular case and on the demands of equity and good faith. According to Professor
Friedman, such rules "are tolerable as operational realities only in those areas of law where the
social order or the economy can afford the luxury of slow, individuated justice." Lawrence M.
Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 792 (1967).
Our society has apparently determined that we can afford such luxury with respect to malprac-
tice actions. One the other hand, where "there is a social interest in mass handling of transac-
tions, a clear-cut framework of nondiscretionary rules is vital." Id. To date, fiduciary
obligation is governed by these kinds of rules. Professor Pound described the application of
nondiscretionary rules as follows: "[N]o scope [is] given for application to circumstances. The
cases are fitted to the straightjacket of the rule, not the rule shaped in its application to the
circumstances of fact of the case." Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation:
The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1960).
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actions involving attorney wrongdoing. 213
213. Some states have come at least part way. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-570 to -581
(Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West
1982).

